Water Law, Water Transfers, and Economic Efficiency: The Colorado River by Burness, H. Stuart & Quirk, James P.
('/ 
(, 
Reprinted for private circulation from THE }OURNAf, OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 
Volume XXIII, April, 1980. Copyright 1980 by the Univei:sity of Chicago Law School. 
All rights reserved. 
WATER LAW, WATER TRANSFERS, AND 
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: THE COLORADO 
RIVER* 
H. STUART BUR1YESS and 
University of 1Vew 1\fexico 
JAMES P. QUIRK 
California lnstifute of Technology 
ALLOCATIVE inefficiency in \vater use arising from restrictions on the
transfer of \Vater rights is not a ne\v theme. Ho\vever, the doctrine of prior 
appropriation, by \Vhich users acquiring \Vater rights earlier in time have 
seniority in periods of "lo\v0 river flo\v, generates additional inefficiencies as 
a consequence of unequal sharing of risk among appropriators.1 Inefficien­
cies can also arise from suboptimal storage policies.2 Finally, most uses of 
\vater generally result in return flo\vs to the rivercourse, \Vhich, in the face 
of inadequately defined entitlements to \vater, generate externalities that can 
present substantial obstructions to the transfer of water rights, hence foster­
ing further inefficiencies. 
While the analysis of the present paper is intended to be general, we have 
set it in the backdrop of the Colorado River so as to fix the concepts and 
problems more concretely. As the Colorado River is the single most impor­
tant source of \Vater supply in the arid \Vest, it seems an appropriate context 
in \vhich to perform the analysis. 
In the tradition of Posner3 and others \Ve consider economic efficiency the 
major determinant in the develop1nent of legal doctrines, so that generally, 
at least in a naive sense, \Ve cannot discriminate bet\veen econo1nic and legal 
efficiency. Ho\vever, in those instances where there is a distinction­
emanating from the failure of statutes to adapt to changing economic 
climates-administrative efficiency and distributional considerations may 
suggest a second best ans\ver to the proble1n of economic efficiency. 
We first present a brief description of the Colorado River and the histori­
cal events that have led to its present state of development. We then present 
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1 This result is developed in detail in Section II-A infra. 
2 See H. Stuart Burness & James P. Quirk, \Vater Rights and Optimal Reservoir �Ianage­
tnent (December, 1977) (Calif. Inst. Tech., Soc. Sci. \Vorking Paper No. 165). 
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a descriptive model of a river economy based on the doctrine of prior appro­
priation 'vater rights and find that unequal sharing of risks generates in­
efficiencies in the absence of transferable \Vater rights. In examining the 
obstacles to \Yater-rights transfer, \Ve find that the current doctrine is inade­
quate to resolve the attendant problems; in particular, under current water 
la\v, externalities in the form of return fto\vs cannot be internalized. A 
characterization of optimal river development suggests possible modifica­
tions of the appropriative doctrine. 
I. THE COLORADO RIVER: BACKGROUND
Since the closing of Hoover Dam in 1936, the Colorado River with its 
elaborate system of diversion and storage works has become perhaps the 
most controlled and closely monitored \Vatercourse in the entire \Vorld. Of 
the 13.5 million acre feet (MAF) average yearly runoff, scarcely a bucketful 
more than the 1.5  MAF required by treaty is delivered to Mexico. Every­
thing else is either consumed for agricultural, domestic, municipal, and 
industrial purposes or stored for possible future uses. 
The importance of the Colorado derives not from its size but from the fact 
that it is essentially the only source of surface \vater in this arid region. 4 
Consequently, the history of the river is marked by repeated and continual 
controversy, resulting in a plethora of institutions that account for the cur­
rent patterns of \Vater rights, \vater use, and \vater storage. \Vhat is surpris­
ing is that, for the most part, allocation of the river among interested parties 
has been accomplished primarily through compact and legislation rather 
than litigation. 
The cornerstone of the Colorado River's institutional structure is the Col­
orado River Compact of 1922. In principle the compact divided the waters of 
the Colorado between the Upper and Lower Basin states. 5 The desire to 
consummate such a division \Vas mutual. The Rccla1nation Act of 1902 had 
encouraged the development of the Lo\ver Basin \Vith its richer soil and 
longer gro\ving season. The Upper Basin was concerned that acquisition of 
water rights in the Lower Basin might preclude later Upper Basin develop-
1nent. 
4 The Colorado River Basin comprises some 242 ,000 square iniles of drainage area, and the
Colorado River's average historical runoff at Lee Ferry of 13.5 i\IAF is small compared to other 
river basins. For example, the Columbia River's drainage area is considerably smaller while 
its runoff exceeds that of the Colorado by an order of magnitude. At the other extreme, the 
Delaware River has a runoff that approximates that of the Colorado River while its drainage 
area is only a tenth of the Colorado River Basin. The geographical location of the Colorado 
River Basin is shown in Figure I. 
s Colorado, \Vyoming, Utah, and New l\fexico con1prise the Upper Basin while California, 
Arizona, and Nevada comprise the Lower Basin. 
I x 
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Source: Annual Report, 1975, Colorado River Board of California 
Ho\vever, the Lo\ver Basin \Vas not \vithout problems of its o\vn. The 
diversion \vorks for the In1perial Valley irrigation area in Southern Califor­
nia required the delivery of water through Mexico via the Alamo Canal. The 
problems associated \vith dual sovereignty \vere compounded by a ruinous 
flood in 1904-1905, and pressures for an all-American canal and a Lower 
Basin storage facility to regulate river flo\v gre\v steadily. 
Due to the enor1nous costs and the legal aspects of contro11ing an interstate 
stream, the participation of the federal government \Vas required. As the 
construction of such a project \vould \Vorsen the Upper Basin's position 
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vis-3.-vis the Lo\ver Basin, it was clear that a guarantee for Upper Basin 
rights would be required as a part of any agreement to control the river. This 
guarantee appeared in the terms of the compact. 6 
The dominant provision of the compact \Vas the Upper Basin's require­
ment to deliver 7 5 MAF of water at Lee Ferry, Arizona (the dividing point 
between the Upper and Lower Basins) during every ten-year period. At the 
time the compact \Vas struck, best esthnates placed the average annual 
runoff of the Colorado at 15 to 16 MAF per year. Given an average flow of 
15 MAF per year, the Upper Basin's obligation to deliver 7.5 MAF each year 
on the average effectively meant that the Upper Basin shouldered the brunt 
of the stream-variability burden. 7 More importantly, recent studies by the 
Lake Powell Research Group indicate that earlier estimates of river flows 
were biased upwards and that actual long-run average flows are roughly 
13.5 MAF per year. Thus after deliveries to the Lower Basin-(7.5 MAF) 
adjusted upward to reflect the Upper Basin's share (. 75 MAF) of the 1.5  
MAF required by treaty for delivery to Mexico, only 5.25 MAF per year is 
available, on average, for consumption in the Upper Basin; and even this 
must be reduced (to 4. 75 MAF) to account for evaporation losses in Upper 
Basin reservoirs. 
In contrast \Vith this, consider the situation in the Lo\ver Basin \Vhere 
gross deliveries of 8. 25 MAF are received. Inflows between Lee Ferry and 
Lake Mead average .8 MAF per year, just offsetting evaporation losses in 
Lake Mead. Subtracting the Mexican requirement of 1.5 MAF per year, 
approximately 6. 75 MAF of water is available for Lower Basin consumption 
in a given year. While the Upper Basin is about I MAF from complete 
appropriation, almost all Lo\ver Basin \Valer is used. Current uses of the 
Lower Basin's allocation are: Arizona, 1.2 MAF; California, 5 .0  MAF (al-
6 The compact was the outco1ne of the first of a series of controversies concerning the 
Colorado River. Other controversies concerned the division of waters among the Upper Basin 
states (the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, which transformed the co1npact into law had 
already allocated water a1nong the Lower Basin states-4.4 MAF to California, 2.8 MAF to 
Arizona, and ,31\IAF to Nevada), the extent of the United States's obligation to deliver water to 
l\fexico, and a continuing feud between Arizona and California arising from Arizona's fear of 
losing its undeveloped water allocations to California. The latter feud ended with the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. California 373 U.S. 546 (1963). which, among other 
things, ultimately led to the comn1encement of the construction on the Central Arizona Project, 
a highline canal to deliver 1.3 l\fAF of water annually to the Phoenix-Tucson area at a cost of 
$1.4 billion. For a thorough analysis of the events leading up to the legislation and litigation 
arising from these controversies see Charles J. l\Ieyers, The Colorado River, 19 Stanford L. 
Rev. 1 (1966); and Charles J. Meyers & Richard L. Noble, The Colorado River: The Treaty 
\vith Mexico, 19 Stanford L. Rev. 36'7 (196'7). For an historical narrative of the compact see 
Norris Hundley, \Yater and the \Vest (1915). 
7 \Vhile the compact actually requires '751\fAF to be delivered every ten years, the Bureau of 
Reclamation's release policy makes it appear that the Upper Basin would have little latitude in 
passing variability on to the Lo\ver Basin. 
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though California's consumption had been as high as 5 .4 MAF in previous 
years); Nevada, .1 MAF. Allocations for the three states are: Arizona, 2.8
MAF; California, 4. 4 MAF; Nevada, 0.3 MAF. However, after the Central 
Arizona Project comes on line in 1985, none of these states 'vill receive their 
full allotment. After prorationing for Mexican deliveries, available water 
will be: Arizona, 2.5 MAF; California, 4.0 MAF; Nevada, 0.29 MAF, as­
suming no dra\vdo,vn on reservoir levels. This 'vill be felt most severely in 
California 'vhich must experience 1 MAF loss in reduced consumption of 
Colorado River water yearly. 8 
II. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF COLORADO RIVER USE
In the previous section we outlined aggregate allocational problems perti­
nent to the Colorado River. Other problems arise from the doctrine of ap­
propriative \Yater rights, past and present storage policies-and the Bureau of 
Reclamation's implicit Policy of determining limitations on appropriations
and its corresponding release policies�and inadequate definition of rights to 
return flows. The technical aspects of appropriative water rights and ques­
tions related to storage are analyzed else,vhere. 9 In the follo,ving sections \Ve 
attempt to identify the inefficiencies fostered by the appropriative doctrine. 
A. The Piwe Doctrine of Prior Appropriation 
In the humid eastern United States the doctrine of riparian water rights 
descended from the English common la\V. Riparian \Yater rights are based 
on the right of a landowner whose property is bordered by water to use that 
water on his land. The right is usufructuary so that, strictly speaking, the 
O\Vner may not diminish the supply of 'vater. Ho,vever, the doctrine is 
interpreted so that riparians may make \Vithdra\vals that are "reasonable" in 
relation to th.e needs of do\vnstream riparians. 
The dominant use of 'vater in the United States is consumptive private use 
prin1arily in irrigation, industry, and municipal \Vater supplies. Use in the 
arid Colorado River Basin is dominated by irrigated agriculture. Because 
irrigation diverts large quantities of \Valer \Vith lo\v return flo\vs, significant 
quantities of \Vater are not returned to the river. Thus, in spite of "reason­
able use" modifications, the riparian doctrine is inadequate in the case of 
rivers used for irrigation. Consequently, a western American innovation 
emerged in the form of the doctrine of appropriative \vater rights. Under this 
8 Claims on the river will be even greater when the questions of Indian and federal reserved 
rights are addressed. The figures stated in the text are' a matter of dispute among the Lov,.er 
Basin states. 
9 See, respectively, H. Stuart Burness & James P. Quirk, Appropriative \Vater Rights and
the Efficient Allocation of Resources, 69 Anl. Econ. Rev. 25 (1919); and id. \Vater Rights and
Optimal Reservoir l\fanagement, supra note 2. 
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doctrine, rights are obtained by physically diverting water and putting it to 
beneficial consumptive use. Under the appropriative doctrine, priorities are 
detennined by the chronological pattern in \Vhich uses are developed: "first 
in time means first in right." Ho\vever, in thnes of extreme drought, priori­
ties are generally established in the order: (!) municipal and domestic; (2) 
irrigation; (3) commercial and industrial. In this event compensation may be 
required for senior appropriators \vhose rights are ten1porarily usurped. 
Adopting beneficial consumptive use as the standard for obtaining the 
\vater property right was necessary in order to encourage investment in 
facilities for diverting \Valer, on the one hand, and to lilnit appropriation and 
thus discourage undue speculation in unappropriated \Vaters, on the other .10 
Ho\vever, follo\ving Dales 11 we observe that the property right is not an 
absolute right to the associated property but rather a right to use the prop­
erty in a prescribed fashion. Under the appropriative doctrine the tenet of 
beneficial consumptive use in essence allo\vs the use or diversion of a quan­
tity of \Vater for a specified purpose as prescribed by contract, but ignores the 
question of o\vnership of return fl.o\vs. \Ve examine the nature of return-flo\v 
externalities in in ore detail later. In the rernainder of this section \Ve analyze 
the efficiency properties of the appropriative doctrine for a simplified 
paradigm in \Vhich there are no return fl.o\vs. 
With zero-return flows, the pattern of priorities established by the 
chronological sequence of an appropriator's diversions might seem to guar­
antee the tenure certainty of senior rights O\vners. 12 Unfortunately in prac­
tice this is not always easy to assure. Due to spatial dispersion of appropri­
ators, informational inadequacies, and random elements, it is often difficult 
to determine \vhether a diminished downstream flo\v to appropriators is the 
result of the stochastic nature of river flows or of the actions of upstream 
appropriators. Moreover, this tenet of the appropriative doctrine, \vhile 
assuring an aspect of legal efficiency, is bought at the cost of economic 
inefficiency, for each subsequent appropriator faces a distribution over river 
flows which is less desirable than that faced by his immediate predecessor. 
The probability of the first appropriator's delivery exceeding a certain bench­
mark quantity is always greater than the probability of the second appro­
priator's delivery exceeding that benchmark quantity; this relationship holds 
for any given benchn1ark quantity and for any senior-junior comparison. 
1° C. J. �·!eyers & Richard A. Posner, �Jarket Transfers of \Vater Rights: Toward an Im­
proved �Jarket in \\later Resources (National \\later Com1nission, Legal Study No. 4, N\VC­
L-71-009, July 1971), indicate that the litnitation to beneficial consu1nptivc use does not neces­
sarily eliminate speculation or always preclude uneconomic uses. They suggest as an alternative 
that rights to unappropriated waters be auctioned off. 
11 J. H. Dales, Land, \Valer and Ownership, 1 Can. J. Econ. 791 (1968). 
12 Tenure certainty is the protection of a rights owner against the loss of right through the 
legal action of others. 
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To see this, number appropriators in order of their seniority in claims to 
\Vater, \vith the most senior appropriator being number 1, the next most 
senior number 2, and so forth. Let a1 denote the amount of \vater rights of 
1-l 
appropriator i and let A1_1 =I a1 denote the total of \Vater rights senior to
j=1 
appropriator i. Letf(x) denote the probability density function (pdj) over 
streamflows x, and let gtx1) denote the pdf over streamflows facing appro­
priator i .  Then we have g1(0) = F(A1_1) , with g1(z) = f(A1_1 + z) for any 
z � 0. 
In particular, the probability that appropriator i \vill receive b units of 
\Vater or more is given by 
1 - G1(b) 2 r g1(z)dz = 1 - F(A1_1 + b).
SinceA1_1 <A1_, for i <j, it follows that 1 - F(A1_1 + b) ii;; 1 -F(A1_, + b) 
for any i <j, with strict inequality for F(A1-1 + b) > O, F(A1_, + b) < I .  That 
is, senior appropriators face more desirable probability distributions over 
streamflo\vs than do junior appropriators. This is illustrated in Figure II. 
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PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS OVER RIVER FLO\VS FACED BY THE FIRST APPROPRIATOR (G1(X)) 
AND THE SECOND APPROPRIATOR (G2(X)) 
(f Is the Maximum Flow of the River) 
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Because of tlfe natural applicability to the Colorado River system of 
do\vnstream \vater use, \Ve conduct our analysis of the appropriative doc­
trine in the context of a paradigm of downstream \vater use. When available, 
appropriators receive their allocation and consume it in its entirety; there are 
zero return flo\vs. In addition, surplus \Vater bypasses appropriators; there 
are no flood damages. We also kno\vingly omit scenic, recreational, and 
public good properties as well as hydroelectric possibilities. 13 In a sense such 
a model, given its limitations, is quite appropriate for the Colorado River 
Basin. Consider especially the Lower Basin, where of the 6. 75 MAF avail­
able for use, approximately 5.5 MAF is used in agriculture. The presence of 
diversion facilities along the river renders the possibilities of flood damage 
minimal. In the quest for simplicity we posit the existence of firms producing 
identical products, \vith the same production function. This assumption can 
be relaxed with no qualitative change in results but at the cost of much more 
cumbersome arguments. 
The profits for a representative firm consist of revenues minus costs. 
Revenues (R) depend on deliveries of water (d) while costs (C) depend on 
diversion capacity (a) installed. Thus C(a) is the annualized construction and 
inaintenance costs of a diversion facility of size a. We assume that costs are, 
within a range, independent of deliveries so that facilities deteriorate with 
age and not \Vith use. As no firm constructs capacity in excess of its right to 
receive \Vater and the limitation of beneficial consumptive use precludes the 
user from having rights in excess of his ability to divert water, \Ve can 
identify a as the firm's water right.14 As a first approximation, \Ve suppose 
that the revenue function is nondecreasing \Vith nonincreasing marginal 
returns to diversion. As the firm's diversions cannot exceed its diversion 
capacity, the assumption of no flood damages implies that water in excess of 
a merely bypasses the diverter, giving the revenue function the appearance 
in Figure III. 
Without loss of generality, we assume there are no delivery costs; capacity 
costs are sho\vn in Figure IV. 15 The latter are assumed to be increasing with 
nondecreasing marginal costs as \Vell. 16 
13 These are not negligible. Hoover Dam produces in excess of 3,000 M\V. However, the 
situation is perhaps self-correcting. One-half of this power goes to Southern California Edison, 
of which two-thirds is needed to pump \vater up over the Palo Verde mountain range so it can 
begin its descent into the metropolitan Southern California area. However, as the l\fetropolitan 
\Vater District has lowest priority among the California water users, in the event of a water 
shortage they \vould be the first to lose service and hence power needs would be lessened. In this 
case the reduction of a generating head in Lake l\Iead would be only of secondary ilnportance. 
14 \Vhen retun1 flows are nonzero, ·we \Viii no longer be unambiguously able to equate 
diversion capacity \Vith water rights. 
15 In fact, the Bureau of Reclamation charges Lower Basin users 25 cents to 50 cents per acre 
foot of water to cover operating costs of its reservoirs. 
16 Note that once diversion capacity is installed, the related costs are sunk. 
R 
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As sho\vn above, senior appropriators face preferred distributions over 
streamflo\vs. Hence senior appropriators tend to build larger diversion ca­
pacities vis-ll-vis junior appropriators. To see this \Ve employ an argu1nent 
analogous to the river-flo\v argu1nent above. Given the assumption of identi­
cal firms, the probability that revenues for the first firm exceed a certain 
benchmark level is at least as great as the probability that revenues for the 
second firm exceed that bench1nark level, and so on. This implies that at any 
level of capacity expected revenues for the first firm exceed those for the 
second. Since expected profits equal expected revenues n1inus (deterministic) 
capacity construction costs, the expected profit-n1aximizing diversion capac­
ity must satisfy marginal expected revenue equal to marginal cost. For any 
level of capacity, we have 1nargina1 expected revenue for the first appro­
priator exceeding that of the second. With din1inishing marginal revenue and 
each firm facing identical cost functions, at a maximum of expected profits 
the first firm builds diversion capacity which exceeds that of the second 
firm.17 (See Figure V.)  
Given that senior appropriators build larger diversion facilities and obtain 
rights to larger quantities of \Valer than do junior appropriators, \Ve can no\v 
identify the econo1nic inefficiencies due to the appropriate doctrine. To do 
this \Ve construct an alternative to the appropriative doctrine. 
Our alternative is sirnilar to the doctrine of correlative \Vater rights in 
ground \Valer la\v. The correlative doctrine e1nerged as a consequence of the 
EMR 
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expected 
marginal 
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FIGURE V 
MC (0 marginal cost of 
building diversion 
capacity for the 
representative firm) 
SENIOR APPROPRIATORS APPROPRIATE �fORE \VATER 
(a1 > aJ for i < j; i Is the Senior Appropriator and j Is the Junior Appropriator)
17 For a more detailed statement of this argument, see Burness & Quirk, supra note 9.
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cominon property characteristics of percolating ground \Vater \vith the land­
O\Vner's rights in the common pool limited to the proportion of his overlying 
land to all land overlying the pool. In our paradigm all firms are identical, so 
\Ve propose as an alternative a doctrine of equal sharing; thus all streamfto\vs 
are divided equally among appropriators. We show that for any streamflow 
equal sharing leads to greater aggregate profits than does the appropriative 
doctrine. 
\Vhen water is reallocated, diversion capacity must be reallocated; but \Ve 
can ignore this fact since all capacity costs are sunk. Thus \Ve need consider 
only revenues. We consider the case of t\vo appropriators. 18 Under decreas­
ing inarginal productivity in \Vater use we observe that, at capacity, 1nargi­
nal revenue of the first appropriator is less than that of the second appro­
priator for any level of deliveries to the second appropriator. Since under the 
appropriative doctrine the second appropriator receives no \Vater until the 
first appropriator is diverting at maximum capacity, the productivity of the 
last unit of water received by the second appropriator is al\vays greater than 
that of the last unit of water received by the first appropriator, for any level 
of river fto\vs. Consequently, aggregate productivity and hence revenue can 
be increased by reallocating \vater fron1 the first appropriator to the second. 
In fact aggregate productivity (revenues) is n1aximized \vhen the n1arginal 
productivity of the first appropriator equals that of the second appropriator 
for an levels of river flo\VS. But this means that aggregate diversion capacity 
and river flo,vs are divided equally bet\veen them. Since aggregate revenues 
(profits) are 1naxin1ized in all possible states of nature under equal sharing, it 
follo\vs that the appropriative systein is inefficient. 19 A graphical exposition 
appears in Figure VI. 
An application of the Coase theorem20 provides a straightfor\vard mecha­
nism to effect an equal-sharing allocation. With the establishment of compet­
itive markets in which water rights can be freely bought and sold, the 
inefficiencies identified above can be eliminated. \Vhile all \Vater economists 
espouse freely transferable \vater rights, it is for a sotne\vhat more basic 
reason that do \Ve. Usually \vhen the transfer of \Vater rights is advocated, it 
18 The argument hnmediately generalizes to an arbitrary finite nun1ber of appropriators. 
19 This result holds, ceteris paribus, regardless of whether or not diversion capacity is reallo� 
cated among appropriators. If diversion capacity is not reallocated, then aggregrate profits are 
maximized by equating, if possible, the marginal revenue product of "'ater between the l\\'O 
users; otherwise, one can completely satisfy the needs of the junior appropriator and deliver all 
remaining water to the senior appropriator. If diversion capacity can be reallocated, intuition 
suggests that diversion capacity and water delivered be dh•ided equally among all appro­
priators. In Burness & Quirk, supra note 9, we show that such an allocation is Pareto optimal,
given increasing marginal costs of constructing diversion capacity, with appropriate extensions 
to the case \vhere a range of decreasing inarginal costs are allowed. 
20 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. I (1960). 
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REVENUES UNDER APPROPRIATION AND EQUAL SHARING 
is in order that, among different alternative uses, water \viH be assigned to 
its most productive use. 21 We have observed that even a1nong identical users 
inefficiencies remain under the appropriative doctrine when the transfer of 
water rights is prohibited. These inefficiencies stem from the unequal shar­
ing of risk along the river and the resultant priority-related allocations and 
actual deliveries of \vater. 22 
However the transfer of water rights is not without problems. Because of 
imperfect substitutability among priority levels of water availability, 
monopoly problems may exist. Presumably this could be eliminated through 
an appropriate system of bribes. 
At a competitive equilibrium with N identical firms and with freely trans­
ferable water rights, each appropriator purchases !/Nth of every other ap­
propriator's water right and diversion capacity: the doctrine of equal sharing 
is effected. As all diversion works are perfect substitutes for each other, the 
price per unit of capacity is the same for all firms. The price per unit of firm 
i's \vater right, including the associated diversion capacity cost, is equal to 
the marginal expected profitability of water use by the ith firm at the equilib­
rium allocation. As senior appropriators originally possessed a more attrac-
21 See, for example, J. \V. Milliman, \Vater Law and Private Decision Making: A Critique, 2 
J. Law & Econ. 41 (1959).
ii E\'en in our scenario, which abstracts from risk aversion, this is true, as by the profit
function profits are nonlinear in water deliveries. 
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tive right, the per unit price of their rights exceeds that of junior appro­
priators. Ho,vever, at the equilibrium prices purchasers are indifferent among 
suppliers at the margin; equilibrium prices are risk adjusted. 
B .  The Problem of Return Flows 
Ultimately, the cause of inefficiency in the appropriative doctrine is the 
restrictions on the transfer of \Vater rights. Limitations on the transferability 
of water rights exist in the form of federal, interstate, _interregional, and 
intrastate restrictions. Federal controls stem primarily from concerns over 
the repayment of construction and operation and maintenance costs of stor­
age and diversion facilities. Interregional restrictions in the case of the Col­
orado River exist in the 1948 compact (Upper Basin) and the 1963 Supreme 
Court decision, Arizona v. California (Lower Basin). Intrastate restrictions 
stem from the historical notion that water rights should be tied to the land 
and, to some extent, the purpose to \Vhich the original right \Vas assigned. 
Under the appropriative doctrine, one \Vay in ,vhich \vater transfers can 
be prevented is the following. If the proposed transfer of an existing water 
right would impair the right of a third party, then the transfer is not allowed. 
If challenged, the seller bears the burden of proving nonimpairment, gener­
ally a quite costly process. While the appropriative doctrine seems clear on 
the matter of rights of senior vis-3.-vis junior appropriators, in fact the 
doctrine does not adequately delineate rights to return flows. 
In the bulk of the literature on the appropriative doctrine, wherever the 
tenet of 11beneficial consumptive use" is discussed, the focus is on Hben­
eficial. "  Although there is doubt whether the limitation to "beneficial" use is 
meaningful, there is more doubt \vhether it is appropriate. 23 
In conjunction \Vith the issue of return fto\vs, focus falls more naturally o n  
the "consumptive" aspect of \Valer use. 24 Most uses o f  water require the 
diversion or application of more \Valer than is actually consumed: return 
flows may be as lo,v as 5 to 10 per cent for evaporative cooling, range from 
30 to 60 per cent in agricultural use, or be as high as 80 to 90 per cent for 
domestic and municipal use. The return fto\vs thus generated are exter­
nalities \Vhich upstream appropriators create and do,vnstream users capture. 
n F. C. Struck1neyer & ]. E. Butler, \Valer: A Review of Rights in Arizona, Arizona \Veekly 
Gazette, 1960, recount the case of a California farmer who, during the off-season, used his 
irrigation water to flood gophers from their holes. The courts subsequently enjoined this use. 
24 Both the Upper and Lower Basin employ accounting methods for water use based on the 
notion of beneficial consumptive use, or at least a close proxy. The Lower Basin uses "diver­
sions less return flows" as the accounting 1nethod; the Upper Basin uses <lnet depletions." The 
former is exactly "beneficial consumptive use," the latter is diversions less return flow plus any 
water that the u!:>"er could salvage, say by employing more efficient methods (as opposed to types) 
df use, such a.s lining of diversion carlals, and so on. \Vhile these practices account for water 
consumed, they do not assign rights to return no,,,s, 
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As current 'vater law does not adequately specify rights to return flo\VSi \Ve 
investigate the economic aspects of return flows and suggest 1nodifications to 
the existing doctrine. 
We follow the notation introduced in the previous section and let {3 be the 
fraction of water diverted by the typical firm that is actually consumed. 25 
Thus 1 - f3 is the fraction of return flo\vs. Given this, t\vo possible configu­
rations of river use are considered. In one the river develops from its mouth 
upstream, in the other from its source do\vnstreanl. In either case successive 
appropriators face a less "desirable" river than before, so that, by the analy­
sis of the previous section, junior appropriators build smaller diversion ca­
pacities. We assert that the development from a source downstream leads to 
higher profits. When developing from the mouth upstream, the largest ap­
propriator is farthest do\vnstream and no one is there to capture his (large) 
return fio\v. Alternatively \Ve can ask \Vhether a ne\v appropriator \vould 
prefer to locate upstream or do,vnstream relative to an existing appropriator, 
ceteris paribus. We ans\ver the question in the context of a deterministic 
river fio\v although the argument generalizes, 'vith some additional complex­
ity, for stochastic river flo\vs. 
Suppose the river flo\v is 1000-acre feet per year with certainty and an 
existing appropriator has a delivery contract for that entire ainount. Clearly 
our ne\v appropriator prefers to locate do\vnstream as in that case he can 
divert the existing appropriator's return flow; upstream he can divert noth­
ing. Thus, optimally, the river develops froin the source do\vnstreani. 26 In 
this \Vay do,vnstream junior appropriators can capture the return flo\vs 
generated by their upstream seniors. Moreover, the argument sho\vs that 
this manner of river developinent is incentive-compatible on an individual 
decision-making basis as 'veil. 
Although there are no market-related forces that guarantee the delivery of 
return flo\vs to do\vnstrea1n users, it appears that the limitation of beneficial 
consu1nptive use \vould suffice to ensure the production of return-flo\v exter­
nalities. In fact it does, and the limitation of beneficial consumptive use has 
the potential to disrupt economic efficiency only \vhen the transfer of rights is 
considered and, in particular, only \Vhen the right is transferred outside the 
hydrologic system within which the right is defined. 
25 The value of {3, to an extent, dictates the most suitable rights doctrine. For example, if f3 = 
1 there are no return flo\\'S, indicating the suitability of the appropriative doctrine. On the other 
hand, "'hen f3 = 0 there are 100% return flows, or, alternatively, no actual consumption of
diverted water occurs. In this case the riparian doctrine see1ns natural. 
26 The generally observed pattern of development frmn the 1nouth upstream, as in the case of 
the Colorado River, occurs then in spite of the nature of water rights rather than because of 
them. Generally this is attributed to clhnatic factors, longer growing seasons, more productive 
soil, and so forth. It also nlight be noted that among the furthest do\vnstrea1n divertors is the 
In1perial Valley, where there is no return flow; instead the runoff drains into the Salton Sea. 
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C. Solutions to the Problem of Return Flows 
We now separate the problems inherent in the appropriative doctrine from 
the problems of return fto,vs. Y.le assume that a1nong a fixed number of 
appropriators (N) with fixed aggregate diversion capacity (A,v), individual 
diversion capacities and th� schedule of deliveries to individual divertors are
determined so as to produce a n1aximum of aggregate profits along the river. 
Some,vhat surprisingly, at least at first blush, are the observations that 
when aggregate profits are maximized upstream firms (1) build larger diver­
sion facilities (acquire a right to divert a larger quantity of water) and (2)
have the delivery of water biased in their favor. At second glance these 
results are fairly intuitive: the superiority of upstream appropriators in pro­
ducing externalities suggests that such a scheme is in fact Pareto optimal. 
One-acre foot of 'vater delivered to the first appropriator generates exter­
nalities (return flows) of 
(1 - /3) + (1 - /3)2 + . . .  + (1 - /3),\'-1
acre feet assuming that all do,vnstream appropriators divert the maximum 
amount possible. In general an acre foot of water delivered to the ith ap­
propriator generates return flo,vs (including those by do\vnstream users) in 
the amount 
(1 - /3) + (I - /3)2 + ... + (I - /3).v-1 
acre feet. Thus for any given amount of 'vater available (less than that \vhich 
satisfies all appropriators) the first appropriator receives a larger proportion 
than the second, the second a larger proportion than the third, and so on, 
with the Nth appropriator receiving the smallest proportion. This is depicted 
in Figure VII for the case of three appropriators, with x the maximum flow 
of the river. It is well for us to emphasize at this juncture that this result 
holds for diversions from \Valer available and not simply diversions from 
river flo\vs; that is, dt(x) is diversions by firm i from river fto,vs plus diver­
sions from return flows. For any streamflow x, we have /3d1(x) + f3d2(x) + 
d3(x) = x, while the fact that the river is completely appropriated implies 
that {3A2 + a3 = x. (a, = d1(x) for i = I, 2, 3).27 
We no\v consider a hypothetical river \Vhose (deterministic) ftO\V is X. If 
diversion capacity is costless to construct, the optimal allocation of \Valer 
requires that x be assigned to the first firm, (I - {3')X to the second, and so on, 
" 
27 Recall that A,,. = "2.:afl where a1 is the diversion capacity of firm i, and the quantity pA2 + 1�1 
aa is the level of river flows at which all users will be satisfiedj {3A2 is the amount consumed by
the first two firms, \Yhile a3, in a sense, is the amount consumed by the last appropriator since no
one captures his return flow. 
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FIGURE VII 
OPTIMAL INDIVIDUAL ALLOCATIONS AS A FUNCTION OF RIVE� FLOWS: S'J;'OCHASTIC 
(VARIABLE) RIVER FLOWS 
. 
{1Y = 3) 
with each subsequent firm receiving only the return flow of his upstre_am 
neighbor; thus a , = £, a2 = (I - {3)X, a3 = (1 - (3)2£, ... , a,v = (I - (3)·'-�i, 
'vhere a1 is the dive-rsion capacity of firm i. We assume that return flows are 
produced costlessly, so that given the pattern of river allocation, external 
benefits are equal to the total profits of firms 2 throughN. We write the profit 
function of the first firm as R(a1) = R(x), that of the second firm as R(a2) = 
R((I - {3)x), and so on. The marginal revenue function of each firm is then 
MR(d1), i = 1, . . .  , n, as shown in Figure VIII. In particular note that the 
marginal revenue function for the representative firm is the change in that 
firm's revenue induced by a change in its \Valer allocation. 
Contrast this w.ith !he.change in benefits resulting from, say,·.the importa-. 
Uon.-0f a ma(gini;l u�.it :0f water hy the ith fir;;, ,)n tJris c��,a.dditlo�:U benefits of MR(a1) accrue to tlie ith firm, as well as a�ditipnal beneij.ts of {I - . .
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FIGURE VIII 
THE 1\fARGINAJ� REVENUE SCHEOUI,E 
/3)MR(a1+i) � (l - /3)MR((l - f3)a1) to the i + 1st firm, (! - /3)2MR(a1o.1) � (! 
- f3)'MR((l - f3}'a1) to the i + 2nd firm, and so on. That is, the ith firm's 
decision to import an acre foot of \Vater generates a benefit to itself and 
benefits also all downstream firms through increased return flows. The po­
tential for market failure is clear: unless the ith firn1,s decision to import
reflects the downstream benefits it confers by doing so, too little water will be 
imported. Table I lists the additional benefits received and generated by 
each representative firm through importation of a marginal unit of \Valer by 
that firm. Multiplication of each entry by minus one reflects the effect of 
diminished return flow due to water exports. In reading the table, the entry 
in, say, the fourth column and second ro\v is the marginal benefit to the 
fourth firm resulting from the second firm's importation of a marginal unit of 
\Valer. Summing across each ro\V yields the aggregate additional benefits 
generated through the importation of a marginal unit of water by that firm. 
Summing down a given column yields the aggregate additional benefits 
accruing to that respective firm if it and all firn1s senior to it hnport a 
marginal unit of \Vater. 
In this manner Table 1 provides the ans\ver to the proble1n of internalizing 
the externalities of return flo\vs from importing or exporting \vater. In the 
fashion of Coase \Ve find that the solution is symmetric; for example, the 
ent1y in column four and l'O\V t\vo can be vie\ved either as the amount that 
firm four should pay to receive the externality or the amount that firm two 
� 
� 
"' 
TABLE 1 
MARGINAL BENEFITS RECEIVED AND GENERATED 
(a = 1 - /3) 
Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Total 
FIRMS 1 2 3 4 N Generated cl 
:i: N "' 
F.1 MR(a,) aMR(a,) a'MR(a,) a3MR(a4) aN-1MR(aN) L a'-'MR(a,) <...; 
l=l 0 c:: 
N-> "' 
F.2 0 MR(a,) a.MR(a3 ) aMR(a4) .. . aN-2MR(aN) L cx1-1MR(a1+1) � ,_, t< 
0 N-2 "' 
F.3 0 0 MR(a,) a1MR(a4) . . . cc"-3MR(aN) L a1-1MR(a1+2) t< ,_, > 
:< 
MR(a,) . . .  > z 
0 
"' 
' (') 
F.N-1 .. . aMR(aN) I a1-1MR(at+N-:) 0 z 
l=l 0 
0: 
F.N 0 0 0 0 . . . MR(aN) MR(aN) 
"' "' 
Total ' ' . . . N-1 N-1 k-1 
Received MR(a,) MR(a,)(1 +a) MR(a,) I a, MR(a,) I a, MR(aN) I a, I I or MR(a,) 
1 .. 0 l=O ,_, k-o 1=1 
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should be fined if he fails to supply it (to firm four). 28 As is usual one cannot 
say, in the absence of transaction costs, \Vhich party should bear the burden 
or how it should be shared. 
D. Water Rights and Water Transfers 
We consider a river in \vhich there are 1\7 users, as in the previous section ,  
\Vhere all uses are consumptive and all uses provide return flo\vs. We limit 
the analysis to the case \Vhere all existing and potential firms face the same 
technology. 
There are two fundamental problems which need to be sorted out. One 
concerns the pattern of entitlen1ents along the river; the other is \Vater trans­
fers. Entitlements delimit the pattern of river O\vnership and thus, \Vithin 
limits, the distribution of income along the river. Consider Figure IX. The 
MR ';;. 
·.•;. 
FIGURE IX 
CONSU?-.IER SURPLUS (CS(A1)) OF THE iTH FIRM UNDER THE ORIGINAL RIVER ALLOCATION 
is That is, it is the charge arising, say, if firm hvo changed its diversjon point, return-flow 
point, thnc of diversion, and so on, such that only fun1 four \\'ere deprived of the return flow. 
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shaded area represents the gains frotn the ith firmis use of \Vater. Ho\vever, 
if all of the entitlements are in one firm, all these gains will be captured by 
that one firm. A number of different patterns of entitlements might be ob­
served: all entitlements in one firm, equal sharing of entitlements by all 
firins, and so forth. Since the original entitleinent of \Valer rights defines the 
lhnit on the export of \Valer from the river, no fir1n may export more than its 
entitlement. 1'hus one restriction is obvious: the sum of all entitlements must 
not exceed the flo\v of the river. 
Given numerous possible patterns of entitletnents, \Ve conduct our analy­
sis in the context of one that \Ve feel is in a sense natural. We assume that 
each firm's entitlement is equal to its beneficial consu1nptive use. As 've no\\' 
recognize the existence of return fto,vs, by beneficial consuinptive use \Ve 
mean the \Vater actually consun1e<l by the firn1; that is, beneficial consump­
tive use equals diversions 1ninus return fto\vs. Barring excessive transaction 
costs one might expect to arrive at this allocation regardless of the initial 
holding of \Vater rights through the operation of a 111arket in entitlements. To 
illustrate, suppose one firm begins \vi th rights to the entire ftO\V. The firm 
uses f3 per cent of the river as an input in production and has a return fto,v of 
(1 - {3)X. Auctioning off this fto\v in a market \vith 1nany potential \vater 
users, the finn should be able to sell the right to this 'vater for an amount 
equal to the sum of all the profil5 that wilt be earned by all downstream 
users, a.ssuming that the \vater is used in the most efficient (highest-profit) 
\Vay. 'fhe firm acquiring the right to the return flo\v of the first firm, (1 -
{3';X, uses f3 per cent of it and generates a return flow of (1 - /3)2x which in 
turn is auctioned off at a price equal to the sum of all profits that could be 
earned from the efficient do\vnstrea1n use of this quantity of \Vater (including 
return flo,vs). Under this regitne, \Ve end \Vith a situation in \Vhich each firm 
on the river o'vns rights only to its o\vn beneficial consumptive use. 
Alternatively, the state could auction off rights to beneficial consu1nptive 
use at various locations along the river and presumably \Vould find the 
pattern of rights by location identical to that achieved hy the operation of a 
market in entitlements, \Vhere rights are assigned on the basis of di.versions 
rather than on consumptive use. 
So long as there are zero transaction costs and no restriction s  on the 
buying and selling of rights, any initial pattern of entitlements is consistent 
\vith a pattern of \Valer use that satisfies economic efficiency. All of the 
externalities associated 'vith return fl.o\vs are completely internalized. 
The same is true 'vith respect to the itnporting or exporUng of \Vater. 
Given that under any initial assignn1ent of rights \Ve end up \Vith a pattern of 
rights by location consisting of beneficial consu1nptive use at each location, 
exporting creates no proble1ns. E�ch firn1 has the right to export Hs con­
stunptive use so that no interfer�nce \Vith return flo\vs occurs and there are 
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no problems of externalities present. Importing, on the other hand, does 
involve externalities. Ho\vever, so long as there are zero transaction costs, 
these externalities are also internalized. A firm importing \vater \vill 
negotiate \Vith the next firm do\vnstream and sell its return fto,vs at a price 
equal to the sum of all profits that are generated by the efficient use of the 
\Vater by do\vnstream users, and the same kind of bargain will be made at 
each succeeding downstream location. Admittedly, we are talking about 
idealized solutions to bilateral monopoly problems. To attain such solutions 
generally requires the capability on the part of each \Valer user to export his 
return flo\vs as an alternative to releasing them. If this capability is present 
then the entire amount of increases in do\vnstream profits can be extracted 
fron1 each ?UCceeding user. Moreover, if the pattern of \vater use through the 
econo1ny is to be efficient, firn1s 1nust be able to extract the entire amount of 
do,vnstrea1n profits generated by return fto,vs. 
Problems arise \Vhen transaction costs are nonzero. Specifically suppose 
that firms do not have the capability of exporting return flows, so that an 
amount of \Valer equal to diversions less consumptive use automatically 
returns to the river. This destroys the bargaining position of upstrea1n firms 
in negotiations \Vith do\vnstream users. Moreover, in co1nplex situations 
\vhere return flo\vs of one finn are mixed \Vith mainstream fl.o,vs to 
do\vnstream users, it becomes difficult to enforce \vater rights \Vhen the 
rights are assigned on the basi_s of diversions rather than on consumptive
use. The consequence is that firms tend to use water inefficiently (using flow 
through irrigation rather than sprinklers, using unlined diversion canals, 
and so forth), and import less than optimal amounts of water. 
In principle a centralized authority could correct for the noninternalized 
externalities by an appropriate system of taxes or subsidies. Looking simply 
a t  the problem of imports, the central authority could pay a subsidy to firms 
importing water, the subsidy being equal to the sum of profits from 
do\vnstream users of the return fl.o,vs. With a correctly chosen subsidy, a n  
optitnal amount of imports is assured. Funds to pay the subsidy \vould b e  
generated from lump-sum taxes, say on the do\vnstream firms. The distribu­
tional impact of this is consistent \vith a situation in 'vhich upstream firms 
have rights to any earnings of dov;1nstrea1n fir1ns due to return flo\vs. Alter­
natively, firms could be taxed for not importing \Vater. In this scenario, it is 
as though do\vnstream firms have the right to receive the optimal amount of 
\vater fro1n upstream fir1ns. Upstream firms can supply the needed \Vater by 
reducing their o\vn use or by importing \Valer. The tax per acre foot of \vater 
should be equal to the sun1 of increased do\vnstreain profits due to return 
fto\vs assuming efficieni use of the \vater. 29 
29 \\'bile this solution 1nay seen1 sonle\vhat stra11ge, obser\'e that it is analogous to bribing a 
polluter to cease polluting in the case where the externality is a diseconon1y. 
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In a more realistic world a legal system that limited rights to imported 
water to beneficial consumptive use and threatened upstream firms \vith 
fines for failure to itnport socially desirable \Vater \vould prove unsatisfactory 
for a number of reasons. First, it might provide an incentive for the 
blackmail of upstream firms by downstream firms. 30 Second, it might prove 
conducive to excessively consu1nptive (",vasteful") uses by upstream firms so 
as to minimize their possible do\vnstream liability and maximize the mag­
nitude of their transferable right. One might expect the transaction costs to 
be excessive as a result of choosing the stick over the carrot for persuasion. 
Also \VC \vould question the distributional implications of requiring an un­
compensated subsidization of do\vnstream firms in the form of free \Valer 
imports. This may cause additional problems if upstream firms go bankrupt 
and exit the industry as a result of the subsidization process. 
The above arguments suggest the inappropriateness of this Jatter inethod 
of internalizing externalities from return flo\vs. Consequently it appears pre­
ferable that the importing firm be assigned water rights to the entire quantity 
imported and allo\v or require do\vnstream firms to bribe the ilnporter (pur­
chase rights to his return flo\vs) as an inducement to import the socially 
optimal amount of \Vater.31 Ho\vever,  some attention must be given to the 
real-\vorld implementation of this scheme. 
Our proposal is two-fold. We suggest that rights be limited to beneficial 
consumptive use with entitled firms selling the rights to water which they do 
not consume to firms \vhich have no rights. This \vould minimize transaction 
costs, primarily by rendering exports of \vater nonprobJe1natic, as no firm 
would have the ability to alter the pattern of return flows. 32 Second, 
\Vhenever \Vater is imported, the importing firm retains title to the quantity 
imported with title to return flows relinquished upon purchase by 
downstream users. Due to the difficulty in identifying return flows and their 
users when a substantial length of stream bed is involved, there may be free 
riders; but if the importer's return flo\v is not purchased, he retains the right 
to transfer (export) it at a later date. 
Perhaps one of the most pervasive problems is the historical lack of 
precision in defining original entitlements. As a consequence it is possible to 
observe a sum of entitlements that exceeds river flo\v, leading to problems of­
rights conflict rather than external economies or diseconomies. In such an 
event one \vould expect bitter controversies. 
30 See E. J. Ivlishan, The Choice of L Law or L Law, in E. J. l\lishan, Cost-Benefit Analysis 
(1975). 
31 Observe that our solution is to an extent dependent on the original entitlement of water 
rights. One could easily adapt our analysis to handle other entitlements. 
32 In principle, transfers of waler \Vithin a hydrologic system arc not problematic. However, 
in fact, most rivers consist of many sources and a single mouth: several separable hydrologic 
subsystems. Consequently not intrariver-basin but intersubsystem transfers can be problematic. 
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Our observations are the outcome of a simplified examination of transac­
tion costs under a very restrictive axio1n set. We cannot be sure that our 
conclusions hold H'vithout loss of generality" \vhen complications are intro­
duced: positive costs of building diversion capacity, positive costs of deliver­
ing return flo\VS, variable and uncertain streamflo\vs, informational uncer­
tainties, misrepresentation, salinity buildup, and so on. In addition, we have 
for the most part ignored equity questions, \vhich may prove dominant in the 
final analysis. Thus \Ve do not claim to have presented a definitive answer, 
but rather a convenient point of departure for future research. 
Ill. SUMMARY
Under the priority hierarchy of the appropriative doctrine of water rights 
with "first in time, first in right," restrictions on the transfer of \vater rights 
lead· to inefficient use of \vater due to an unequal sharing of risk among 
other\vise identical firms. The introduction of competitive markets in \vater 
rights eliminates these inefficiencies. Ho\vever, obstructions to transfer of  
\vater rights exist in  the form of federal, interstate, and intrastate restric­
tions. In addition· return-fto\v externalities constitute a natural economic 
obstruction to efficient transfer of \Valer rights. For a simple example \Ve 
have deter1nined ho\\' these externalities might be internalized and, in the 
spirit of Coase, outlined potential solutions in terins of syste1ns of \vater 
rights. In essence our results say: (1) regardless of entitlements, if transaction 
costs are zero, return-ftO\V externalities \vill be internalized; (2) for any given 
pattern of entitlements, return-fto\v externalities may be internalized by  
either bribes or  charges, subject to the usual caveats. 
In the context of the Colorado River Basin, \Ve \vould assert that often 
\vhat appears to be a shortage of \Valer is actually the manifestation of 
restrictions on \Vater rights transfer. For example, the Colorado River 
Aqueduct, which delivers water to the Metropolitan Water District in  
Southern California, i s  operating at  capacity. \Vhen the Central Arizona 
Project comes on line in 1985, assuming prorationing of Mexican \Valer 
requirements, California deliveries can decrease from 5 MAF to as little as 4
MAF per year. As the Metropolitan Water District holds the lowest Califor­
nia priority, its allotn1ent \vould be the first to be curtailed, and such cur­
tailment \vould leave excess capacity in the aqueduct. Thus the means for 
delivering water would exist if the water could be obtained. A potential 
supply source exists among the \Valer users in the Itnperial and Coachella 
irrigation districts, by far the largest \Valer users in Southern California. 
Ho\vever, existing California statutes preclude the transfer of \Vater outside 
irrigation districts; one 'vould hope enabling legislation to be quickly forth­
coming at that time. 
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Generalizing we observe that 85 per cent of all Colorado River water is 
used in irrigated agriculture. A 10 per cent decrease in agricultural usage 
allo\vs close to a 60 per cent increase in \Yater availability for other purposes. 
Moreover, a 10 per cent decrease in agricultural usage \vould not be difficult 
to attain \Vi th lining of irrigation ditches, alternative irrigation technologies, 
changes in crop patterns, and elimination of low-profitability crops. The 
incentive to do so would be provided by proceeds from the sale of water 
rights. 
